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Abstract 
 
Companies increasingly involve the crowd for collective 
decision making and, to aggregate the decisions, they 
commonly average the scores. By ignoring 
crowdworkers’ different levels of experience and 
decision biases, this method may not favor the best 
outcome. Alternatively, decisions can be weighted in 
favor of the more experienced judges in the crowd. 
However, previous research is inconclusive as to 
whether more experienced individuals are any better at 
avoiding decision biases. To answer this question, we 
conduct online crowd-based experiments with a range 
of treatments, comparing the anchoring effect of 
individuals with different levels of experience. Results 
indicate that not only does greater experience not 
protect crowdworkers from the anchoring effect but it 
increases their confidence in their decision, compared 
to less experienced individuals, even if they are wrong. 
Our findings provide valuable insights for both 
researchers and practitioners interested in improving 
the effectiveness of crowdworking decision-making.  
 
1. Introduction 1 
 
Companies using crowdworking for idea generation 
often face the challenge of having to screen hundreds or 
thousands ideas submitted by the crowd. How do they 
select the more valuable ones out of a vast number of 
ideas? For example, when the car manufacturer Fiat 
turned to the crowd to suggest ideas for its new Fiat 500 
model, the call generated over 170,000 design ideas and 
more than 20,000 comments on specific aspects, such as 
the shape of the exhaust or of the chrome bumpers [1]. 
Since most companies do not have the resources to 
evaluate such a large number of ideas, or only with 
disproportionate effort, the crowd is increasingly used 
not only to generate new ideas but also to evaluate them, 
thus doubling up the challenge of how to tackle the 
                                                 
1 Note that [2] draws on the same research environment and 
preliminary results of an earlier version have been presented as a 
poster at the Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI) 2018.  
number of ideas generated and evaluated. Nevertheless 
the method of using a large number of judgements - the 
so-called wisdom of the crowd – continues to offer key 
advantages by i) maximizing the amount and the 
diversity of information by drawing on a large number 
of people from a wide range of information backgrounds 
and, ii) reducing the potential impact of ‘outliers’ - 
extreme decisions based on unreliable or simply 
inaccurate information sources. For a crowd to be wise, 
however, it has to meet the following conditions: i) it 
must be diverse, ii) decentralized, and iii) independent 
in its judgement [3]. The downside of the wisdom of the 
crowd, as the literature also suggests, is that individuals 
might be biased in their decision-making. Based on 
insights from cognitive psychology, biased decision 
making, often simply labeled as “decision biases”, can 
be described as “[…] human behavior which goes 
beyond the rationality assumptions of neoclassical and 
new institutional economic theory” [4]. Examples of 
decision biases include individuals failing to adequately 
judge probabilities, making wrong predictions or being 
too extreme in their judgement [5].  
Another prominent bias that might occur in the 
context of idea evaluation by an online-crowd is the 
well-established anchoring effect [6]. This effect 
describes a disproportionate influence that an initially 
presented value has on a decision maker [6]. The 
reasons for the occurrence of this bias in this context are 
as follows: First, online platforms are characterized by 
increasing information richness and often provide 
information such as ratings given by other workers ([7], 
[8]), which could act as an anchor [9]. Second, 
especially in organic crowdworking campaigns where 
the judgement process is structured into two or more 
phases, the risk of the anchoring effect occurring is quite 
high when the information which potentially acts as 
anchor is revealed to workers in subsequent stages [10]. 
Lastly, the anchoring effect occurs for both types of 
tasks, objective (e.g. estimating the height of the Eiffel 
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tower) and subjective estimations (evaluating the 
creativity of an idea) [11], which covers the majority of 
typical task designs on crowdworking platforms. 
Regardless of this potential risk of biased decision 
making, currently the favorite method for using the 
wisdom of the crowd approach is to simply average the 
judgements of all individual decisions in the crowd [12], 
even though this can lead to suboptimal outcomes 
neglecting, as it does, external information such as 
experience. As an alternative to simply averaging 
individual judgements, researchers (e.g. [13]) have 
proposed weighted models that favor more experienced 
judges in the crowd. The assumption behind this 
approach is that more experienced judges are less likely 
to be affected by the anchoring effect or, if they are 
affected, that their estimation will still be more valid 
than that of a less experienced person. However, 
previous studies on decision making in the offline 
context show contrasting results. While some studies 
indicate that knowledgeable people are less influenced 
by biases (e.g. [14]), others show that even 
knowledgeable people with experience in a given 
context are significantly biased (e.g. [15]). With respect 
to these conflicting results, we want to shed light on this 
question and aim to answer the following research 
question:  
 
Are more experienced people in the crowd less prone to 
the anchoring effect in their decision-making? 
 
To answer this question, we conducted experiments 
on a commercial crowdworking platform, with the 
crowd being given 80 different business model ideas to 
evaluate. We implement an anchor, i.e. information 
about the previous rating results given by others, using 
it as a treatment, and analyze its effect on individual 
raters’ decisions. After idea evaluation, we asked each 
participant about her background experience, using 
several dimensions of experience relevant to the task, 
such as business models, product category, their 
experience in retail and how long they have been a 
member of the platform. In addition, after have 
completed their evaluation, raters were asked how 
confident they felt about their ratings. Results indicate 
that experience in different dimensions does not 
decrease the probability to follow an anchor and 
therefore does not protect against biased decision 
making. Moreover, experienced judges are more 
confident about their decision, even if they are wrong – 
in our case, deviant from experts’ ratings, which we 
used as a benchmark.  
Our study makes contributions to extant research in 
several ways: (1) in contrast to most previous studies, 
our research on the anchoring effect is conducted in the 
context of the large and still growing field of 
crowdworking, following the proposed call for 
additional research on cognitive biases in the IS context 
[8]; (2) we extend prior research on the anchoring effect 
by taking into account not only one but several 
dimensions of experience (product, context, etc.); (3) we 
use a subjective evaluation task in contrast to objective 
tasks such as general knowledge questions; (4) we 
investigate the robustness of weighted models to 
aggregate multiple opinions that favor more 
experienced judges in the crowd. This allows us to 
investigate whether these models could be used to 
provide valid results, even if potentially biased 
decisions might occur within the crowd. Lastly, our 
analysis offers valuable insights for practitioners, by 
helping task designers in crowdworking to avoid 
potential pitfalls. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Anchoring Effect in Decision Making 
Because of humans’ bounded cognitive resources 
[16], if humans would strictly adhere to the laws of logic 
and probability, even a single complex everyday 
situation would require more computations than can be 
performed in a human lifetime [17]. Therefore, people 
tend to apply fast but fallible heuristics in their daily life 
to reduce the complexity of their decision making. The 
downside of this, however, are cognitive biases like the 
anchoring effect. The anchoring effect describes the 
disproportionate influence of an initially presented 
value on decision makers [6]. This cognitive bias is 
subconscious and involves noticing an initial value or 
starting point (the anchor), which influences one’s 
decision (subconsciously) by adjusting one’s response 
in a direction that seems appropriate.  
The main underlying mechanisms of anchoring are 
selective accessibility [18] and confirmatory search 
[19]. Selective accessibility in this case means that as 
long as an initially presented anchor lies within the 
boundaries of a known category (for example:  the 
height of the Eiffel tower is about 300 meters and not 
3,000), participants construct a mental model that 
selectively increases the accessibility of anchor-
consistent information [18]. In line with that, 
confirmatory search means that when a plausible anchor 
is presented, people focus on activating information that 
is consistent with this value and neglect information that 
deviates from the anchor [19]. The occurrence of the 
anchoring effect has been shown in a variety of different 
domains such as general knowledge [20] or probability 
estimation [19]. Previous studies show that both 
uninformative anchors and anchors with informational 
relevance to the task itself are able to influence a 
decision. In their classic study, [6] randomly generated 
anchor values were obtained by spinning a wheel of 
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fortune between 0 and 100 and afterwards asking the 
participants to estimate the percentage of African 
countries in the United Nations. The given anchor 
values had a strong influence on their estimation since 
higher anchors significantly increased the estimations 
compared to lower ones [6]. Another study found that 
the estimation of an athlete’s performance could be 
anchored by the number on his jersey [21]. Anchors 
with relevance to the task can also lead to the anchoring 
effect: in an example from the legal domain, higher 
damage awards were obtained when higher 
compensations were requested in court [22]. Following 
previous results, we assume that the anchoring effect 
will generally affect a crowd’s decision making when an 
anchor is displayed. More specifically, when comparing 
the distribution of ratings with and without displaying 
an anchor, we expect both results of the evaluation to 
differ. Hence, we derive the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The distribution of ratings will differ 
depending on whether an anchor is displayed.    
 
2.2. Influence of Experience on Anchoring 
Effect 
 
Experience in the context of judges who evaluate 
ideas with respect to creativity is defined as “[…] the 
acquisition and cumulative knowledge of reality, 
mechanisms, rules, and procedures related to a specific 
domain” [23]. Previous literature on the influence of 
experience on the anchoring effect shows contradictory 
results. On the one hand, it suggests that experienced 
people utilize information in their decision making 
differently to those less experienced than them ([24], 
[25]) since they:  
 
 process information more quickly due to 
practice and skill 
 process information in their domain of 
expertise more efficiently 
 know more than others and can access that 
knowledge better 
 are less likely to be influenced by factors 
that could influence information processing 
and capacity allocation. 
 
Hence, people with higher expertise should arguably be 
less influenced by anchors. The assumption that greater 
expertise and experience protects against the anchoring 
effect to a certain extent is supported by previous studies 
which assert that both people with high certainty about 
their answer [19] and those with greater relevant 
knowledge are less influenced by anchors [14]. 
Table 1 presents several studies of the influence of 
experience on the occurrence of the anchoring effect. 
Table 1. Studies on the influence of 
experience on the anchoring effect 
Article  Context Experienced 
less 
influenced? 
[14] General knowledge 
questions 
✓ 
[19] Lotteries  (✓) 
[26] Estimating the value 
of houses 
- 
[27] Judgements of event 
probabilities 
- 
[28] Fraud estimation and 
critical event 
prediction 
-  
[18]  Evaluating the value 
of a cars 
- 
[15] Hypothetical crime 
case 
- 
 
On the other hand, results from other studies indicate 
that an anchor does not only affect inexperienced 
decision makers but also experts. For example, car 
experts (dealers and mechanics) with all the necessary 
information available were influenced by anchors when 
evaluating the value of a car [18], and legal 
professionals by information irrelevant to the case [15]. 
Regarding the latter, results of an experiment with a 
hypothetical crime case show that judges’ sentencing 
decisions were strongly influenced by the prosecutor’s 
demand. The sentences given for the same hypothetical 
crime case were significantly higher for participants 
who were presented with a high sentencing demand than 
for those with a low demand [15].  
Based on these results it could be argued that the 
underlying mechanisms for the anchoring effect are so 
engrained in fundamental cognitive processes that 
people regardless of their level of experience and 
knowledge could fall victim to this effect. This 
potentially invalidates the notion that anchors should 
only affect inexperienced decision makers rather than 
expert participants. Based on this argument and the 
majority of results in the field that demonstrate that 
anchoring has a robust effect on human decision making 
regardless of the experience of decision makers, we 
derive our second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Higher experience does not decrease 
the probability to follow a displayed anchor. 
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3. Research Methodology   
 
To test our hypotheses, we design an experiment 
which enables us to (1) analyze the occurrence of the 
anchoring effect in idea evaluation on a crowdworking 
platform and (2) investigate whether experience might 
protect people from being influenced by the anchoring 
effect. In the context of crowdworking, idea evaluation 
tasks for new products, services or business models 
represent a typical task [9]. The ideas in our experiment 
were taken from previous research [29], in which 
students generated business model ideas for perfume in 
a classroom experiment. After having been given basic 
knowledge about business models and the Business 
Model Canvas [30], participants generated business 
model ideas for perfume. Only the best ideas, self-
selected by each participant, were collected. All ideas 
are presented in the same way, consisting of the nine 
elements of the Business Model Canvas [30]. We then 
designed an evaluation task on Crowdflower, a 
commercial crowdworking platform which draws on 
potential contributors distributed worldwide. Because it 
would be unreasonable to ask each participant to 
evaluate all 80 business model ideas, we divided the 
ideas into eight blocks of ten ideas each and randomly 
assigned each business model idea to one block. Each 
participant had to rate the displayed ideas on a seven-
point scale in terms of creativity, novelty and usefulness 
[31]. This part of our experiment represents the control 
condition in which each individual had to evaluate the 
ideas without encountering an anchor. We further 
designed two additional experiments with two different 
treatments, enabling us to investigate the anchoring 
effect. First, we designed an experiment (Crowd 
Anchor) where the information about the previous 
evaluation resulting from the control condition of each 
idea was displayed above the rating scale. Second, we 
designed an additional experiment (Random Anchor) 
where the only difference was that for the displayed 
rating, each idea was assigned a randomly generated 
rating between 1.0 and 7.0. The general task design of 
the control condition was retained for both additional 
experiments. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of a rating 
scale in one of the treatment conditions with the anchor 
displayed in the left-hand corner above the rating scale. 
  
 
Figure 1. Treatment with displayed anchor 
 
To investigate whether we find support for our first 
hypothesis, i.e. the general occurrence of the anchoring 
effect, we compare the average ratings of ideas for each 
experimental condition. Further, we also analyze the 
rating distributions of the different experimental 
conditions to see whether the display of an anchor 
influences the overall rating distribution as well as the 
potential deviation of ratings from experts’ evaluation. 
Finally, we consider the influence of experience on 
anchoring. The experimental design is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Experimental design 
 
To avoid the occurrence of a learning effect and 
potential rating bias through users who assign 
themselves to several tasks in succession, we allowed 
each participant to evaluate only one block. Each block 
of ideas was evaluated by twenty different contributors, 
each earning 0.50$ for the evaluation of one block (= ten 
ideas). After idea evaluation was completed, we pre-
screened the rating of each idea and excluded all those 
with a standard deviation below 0.5, assuming that 
below this threshold, participants wanted to earn money 
as easily as possible and merely clicked through the task 
quickly. In sum we analyzed 4,560 individual ratings, 
1,490 for the control condition and 3,070 for both 
treatment conditions.  
To analyze the influence of experience, all 
participants had to complete a short survey in addition 
to the evaluation task. The aim of the survey was to 
collect a range of data to assess participants’ experience 
or prior knowledge across the following dimensions: 
Context/market mechanism, platform experience, 
product knowledge, and business models. More 
specifically, we asked participants about the length of 
their membership on the platform in number of months 
(platform experience), their experience in retail in 
number of months (context/market mechanism), their 
knowledge about perfume (four items, product 
knowledge), and their experience of business models 
(two items). After the idea evaluation was completed, 
we further asked each subject to rate their confidence in 
evaluating the business model ideas presented to them. 
All scales ranged from 1 = “Not at all” to 7 = 
“Absolutely agree”. Additionally, to find out whether 
the randomly assigned rating of an idea strongly 
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deviates from a more professional evaluation of idea 
quality, we recruited two experts who would serve as a 
benchmark [32]. One came from our university’s 
entrepreneurship center and the other works as a senior 
in-house consultant in a large corporation.  
 
4. Results  
 
4.1. Analyzing the General Occurrence of an 
Anchoring Effect  
 
We first calculated the average rating of each idea in 
each experimental condition. In general, the descriptive 
statistics (Table 2) of the different conditions do not 
differ much from each other.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Condition Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  
No Anchor 80 4.58 .412 2.60 5.87 
Crowd  
Anchor 
80 4.59 .479 3.35 5.50 
Random 
Anchor 
80 4.39 .745 2.60 5.87 
  
To further investigate the different ratings of each 
idea in the different conditions, we compare their 
average ratings, using parametric tests. First, we check 
whether rating distributions show any significant 
deviation from a normal distribution by using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test nor the Shapiro-Wilk test. 
However, results of both tests show no significant 
deviation from a normal distribution (lowest p-value: 
.128). Next, we test for homogeneity of variance for the 
average rating of ideas for each experimental condition 
by conducting a Levene’s test based on the mean as well 
as the median. Both results based on the mean F (2, 237) 
= 19.27, p < .001 and median F (2, 237) = 19.04, p <.001 
show significant results, implying that the homogeneity 
of variances has been violated. Therefore, we conducted 
t-tests specified for data with unequal variances. 
Following [33], we additionally report the effect size for 
each experimental condition. Table 3 presents results of 
pairwise comparisons of the average ratings for each 
experimental condition. First, comparing average 
ratings for the condition where no anchor was displayed 
with the condition where the average rating resulting 
from the control condition of each idea was displayed 
above the rating scale, shows no significant difference 
in ratings. However, this result is not surprising since we 
did not expect the display of the average rating from the 
control condition to significantly change the rating for 
the first experimental condition (Crowd Anchor). 
Table 3. Comparison of average ratings 
 Mean Std. 
Dev.  
Diff-
erence 
Effect 
Size (r) 
No Anchor 4.584 .412 
-.006  
(.462) 
r = .007 Crowd 
Anchor 
4.591 .479 
No Anchor 4.584 .412 
.187** 
(.025) 
r = .154 Random 
Anchor 
4.397 .745 
Crowd 
Anchor 
4.591 .479 
.193** 
(.026) 
r = .153 
Random 
Anchor 
4.397 .745 
Note: *p <.10; **p < .05; ***p< .01 
Moreover, we expected both ratings to lead to 
comparable results because the occurrence of an 
anchoring effect in this case would mean that 
participants incorporate the displayed anchor, based on 
the previous decisions from the control condition, into 
their decision. Comparing the random anchor with both 
the crowd anchor and the control condition shows 
statistically significant differences. Hence, we conclude 
the following: first, the comparison between the control 
condition and the situation where a randomly generated 
rating is displayed demonstrates that the occurrence of 
an anchor affects the subsequent rating. Second, the type 
of anchor displayed also plays a role since comparing 
both treatment conditions with different anchors leads to 
a statistically significant difference in rating results. To 
further investigate the general occurrence of the 
anchoring effect, we also analyzed the distribution of 
individual ratings from each experimental condition 
(Figure 3). In contrast to the analysis of the average 
rating above, we now compare the rating distribution of 
each individual participant in each condition, i.e. 1,490 
for the control condition and 3,070 for both treatment 
conditions (out of a total of 4,560 individual ratings). As 
can be seen, the given distributions differ depending on 
whether and which anchor was shown in the condition. 
First, we can see that in our first treatment condition 
(Crowd Anchor) the range of ratings has been reduced, 
while in our second treatment condition (Random 
Anchor), the range of ratings has increased when a 
randomly generated anchor was shown. 
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This result is in line with the previous comparison of 
average ratings above, supporting our interpretation that 
the occurrence of an anchor effect in this case decreases 
the variance of ratings, leading to comparable 
evaluation results.  
This visual inspection supports our result that 
participants incorporate the anchor provided and 
moreover, that the specific value of the displayed anchor 
strongly influences subsequent ratings.       
     In addition to a visual inspection of these 
distributions, we compare the two rating distributions by 
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic. Our first 
hypothesis is supported if the distributions significantly 
differ from each other. Results are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. K-S statistics for comparison of 
distributions 
Conditions Difference (Combined 
K-S) 
No Anchor -   
Crowd Anchor 
.0716 (.001)*** 
No Anchor -  
Random Anchor  
.0851 (< .001)*** 
Crowd Anchor - 
Random Anchor  
.1378 (< .001)*** 
Note: *p <.10; **p < .05; ***p< .01 
 
Results indicate that the distribution of ratings in all 
experimental conditions differ significantly from each 
other. In addition, we investigate the potential negative 
effect of anchoring, i.e. the tendency of decision makers 
to make decisions towards a presented value that 
deviates from the experts’ assessment. To investigate 
this effect, we calculated the difference from each rating 
to the experts’ rating and compared the differences of 
crowd ratings to experts’ ratings for both experimental 
conditions.      
 
Table 5. Comparison of differences between 
crowds’ rating and experts’ rating 
 Mean  Std. Err. Diff.  
Crowd Anchor 1.329 .0255 -.2481*** 
(.0395) Random Anchor 1.577 .0300 
Note: *p <.10; **p < .05; ***p< .01 
Results (Table 5) show that the randomly generated 
anchor (Random Anchor) leads to a statistically 
significant (p < .001) higher distance to the experts’ 
ratings than the displayed anchor from the control 
condition (Crowd Anchor). This result highlights the 
potential negative effect of anchoring, since initially 
displayed wrong values (anchors) can significantly 
increase the distance to the actual desired result.  
Accordingly, we find support for hypothesis 1 since 
the presence of an anchor changes the distribution of 
ratings, implying the occurrence of an anchoring effect 
in crowd decisions. Moreover, the anchoring effect is 
robust for the anchors displayed in the different 
experimental conditions. 
 
4.2. Analyzing the Anchoring Effect in Relation 
to Level of Experience  
 
To find out whether more experienced people are 
less prone to be influenced by an anchor, we investigate 
whether participants followed it, additionally factoring 
in the influence of participants’ experience. To answer 
our research question, we investigate the data from our 
two treatment conditions to see whether participants 
followed the displayed anchor. We used a logit 
regression with the dependent variable = 1 if the 
person’s rating was consistent with the displayed 
anchor. Due to the fact that people could only rate in 
integers (for example: 4) while the anchor was provided 
as a float (for example: 4.2), the dummy variable is = 1 
if the person’s rating was closer to the provided anchor. 
If the anchor was 4.4, for example, and the person rated 
the idea with 4, the dummy variable would be 1. In 
contrast, if the provided anchor was 4.6, the dummy 
variable would be 1 if the person rated the idea with 5 
since this value is closer to the provided anchor than 4. 
To avoid multicollinearity in our model, since some 
variables for experience consisted of several items, we 
conducted a principal component analysis [34] to 
summarize multi-item variables. Thus, we consider the 
following model [35]: 
 
Yj* = β0 + β1 Memj + β2 BMC_Expj + β3 Perf_Expj + 
β4 Retail_Expj + β5 Conf_Ratingj + ɛj, Y = 1[Yj* > 0]. 
 
Memj represents the reported length of membership on 
the platform of a person, BMC_Expj captures the multi-
items for the reported experience in business models, 
while Perf_Expj captures the different items for the 
reported experience and knowledge of perfume. 
Retail_Expj represents the reported experience in 
months of a participant working in retail, while 
Conf_Ratingj covers the reported confidence of the 
participant when evaluating the business model ideas. 
Figure 3. Distribution of ratings 
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Further, we use clustered robust standard errors on the 
participant level to account for autocorrelation in the 
data since each participant rated ten different ideas [35].  
Results (Table 6) indicate that experience in different 
dimensions, such as relevant to the key product 
(perfume), using and evaluating business models or 
having worked in retail, does not significantly decrease 
the probability of following the displayed anchor. 
 
Table 6. Results of logit regression 
Variable Coef. Std. 
Err.2 
z P > 
|z| 
Memj -.0004 .0031 -.013 .893 
BMC_Expj -.0670 .0530 -1.26 .206 
Perf_Expj .0617 .0385 1.60 .109 
Retail_Expj -.0007 .0008 -.089 .375 
Conf_Ratingj .0576 .0524 1.10 .272 
Constant -1.212*** .2807 -4.32 .000 
Controls1 ✓    
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; 1Gender and age; 
2clustered robust std. err. by participant 
 
However, one might argue that especially when 
analyzing the data from the condition where the average 
rating from the control condition was displayed (Crowd 
Anchor), it might be rational for participants to follow 
the displayed average rating from the control condition 
since their rating matches the average rating from the 
control condition. To address this point, we again used 
our logit model mentioned above and solely analyzed 
the dataset from our second treatment condition 
(Random Anchor). Since we displayed randomly 
generated ratings as anchors for each idea, we assume 
that the probability that these anchors match the quality 
of ideas or reflects the professionals’ rating of the idea 
(= experts’ rating) is quite low. Further, we only analyze 
ideas where the difference between the displayed anchor 
and the experts’ rating was ≥ 2. In sum, we analyzed 740 
observations. Results are illustrated in Table 7. 
In line with previous results, the estimators indicate 
that experience does not significantly decrease the 
probability to follow the displayed anchor, which 
applies even when the displayed anchor strongly 
deviates from the quality of the ideas (difference ≥ 2 
from experts’ rating). These results are constant for 
different dimensions of experience. Thus, our results 
support our second hypothesis. In other words, a higher 
level of experience does not increase protection against 
making a biased decision by following a randomly 
generated anchor.  
 
Table 7. Results of logit regression for random 
anchors with difference to experts’ rating ≥ 2 
Variable Coef. Std. 
Err.2 
z P > 
|z| 
Memj .0096 .0066 1.45 .147 
BMC_Expj -.0423 .1278 -.33 .740 
Perf_Expj -.0029 .0880 -.03 .974 
Retail_Expj .0001 .0018 .08 .937 
Conf_Ratingj .2292* .1380 1.66 .097 
Constant -2.859*** .7665 -3.73 .000 
Controls1 ✓    
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; 1Gender and age; 
2clustered robust std. err. by participant  
 
Surprisingly, our results indicate that people who 
follow the displayed anchor in this situation feel more 
confident about their rating. However, we assume that 
higher confidence does not increase the probability to 
follow the anchor. Rather, we suspect a reverse effect. 
More specifically, we assume that participants who 
follow the anchor feel more confident about their rating. 
Hence, when participants in our experiment rated the 
idea as suggested by the displayed anchor, they felt 
more confident about their decision since it seemed to 
be in line with others. 
In addition to investigating whether participants 
follow the anchor displayed by using a dummy variable, 
we further used a continuous variable to analyze the 
potential influence of different dimensions of 
experience on the occurrence of the anchoring effect. 
Here we calculated the difference between the rating 
submitted by each participant and the anchor displayed 
for all participants in our second treatment condition 
(Random Anchor). If the difference was negative (for 
example: 2.4 [anchor displayed] – 4.0 [participants’ 
rating]) a positive value was calculated by multiplying 
the value by minus one to avoid that negative and 
positive values cancel each other out. We used these 
differences as our continuous, dependent, variable and 
the different dimensions of experience as independent 
variables, and conducted a linear regression. If 
coefficients of different dimensions for experience are 
statistically significant and positive it would suggest that 
experience does protect against the occurrence of the 
anchoring effect.  
Results (Table 8) indicate, however, that experience 
does not significantly increase the distance between the 
displayed anchor and the submitted rating, suggesting 
that the more experienced still follow the anchor. In 
contrast, both membership (in months) on the platform 
and experience of using the business model canvas 
seems to decrease the distance between the displayed 
anchor and the submitted rating. 
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Table 8. Results of linear regression for 
random anchors 
Variable Coef. Std. 
Err. 2 
t P > 
|t| 
Memj -.0069** .0027 -2.52 .013 
BMC_Expj -.0893* .0480 -1.86 .065 
Perf_Expj .0740 .0496 1.49 .137 
Retail_Expj -.0003 .0005 -.65 .514 
Conf_Ratingj .0518 .0636 .82 .416 
Constant 1.345*** .3479 3.87 .000 
Controls1 ✓    
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; 1Gender and age; 
2clustered robust std. err. by participant  
 
Further, we used the difference between the displayed 
anchor and the submitted rating as continuous variable 
and conducted a linear regression for the second 
treatment condition (Random Anchor) where the 
difference between the displayed anchor and the 
experts’ rating was ≥ 2. Hence, we analyzed a situation 
in which we assume that the probability of the displayed 
anchors matching the quality of ideas or reflecting the 
professionals’ rating of the idea (= experts’ rating) is 
quite low.  
 
Table 9. Results of linear regression for 
random anchors with difference to experts’ 
rating ≥ 2 
Variable Coef. Std. 
Err. 2 
t P > 
|t| 
Memj -.0116*** .0040 -2.83 .005 
BMC_Expj -.0678 .0666 -1.02 .310 
Perf_Expj .0841 .0733 1.15 .253 
Retail_Expj -.0002 .0007 -.30 .762 
Conf_Ratingj .0742 .0844 .88 .381 
Constant 1.583*** .4900 3.23 .002 
Controls1 ✓    
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; 1Gender and age; 
2clustered robust std. err. by participant  
 
In line with previous results, the coefficients indicate 
that experience does not significantly increase the 
distance between the displayed anchor and the 
submitted rating (Table 9). Again, the opposite is the 
case since membership (in months) on the platform 
seems to decrease the distance between the randomly 
generated anchor and the submitted rating of 
participants. 
Next, we further investigate the influence of the 
length of platform membership on the confidence of 
ratings since previous results indicate that (i) 
participants who follow the displayed anchor feel more 
confident about their decision (Table 7), and (ii) that 
membership on the platform (Table 9) decreases the 
distance between a randomly generated anchor and 
participants’ rating. Therefore, we want to answer the 
question of whether more experienced people feel more 
confident in the assessment, even if they are wrong. 
Based on our previous results and in line with the 
literature, (e.g. [15]) which used experience working on 
a job as a proxy for experience, we use a participant’s 
length of platform membership as a proxy of experience. 
We differentiate between two groups: experienced 
(membership >=12 months) and relatively 
inexperienced participants (membership <12 months). 
Further, we define a “wrong decision” as a submitted 
rating which deviates at least 2 points from the experts’ 
evaluation. We used a two-sided t-test to compare the 
confidence in being wrong (as defined above) for both 
groups. In sum, we analyzed 936 observations from both 
experimental conditions. Results (Table 10) show that 
more experienced participants are statistically 
significantly (p = .002) more confident about their rating 
even if this rating is wrong in the sense that it strongly 
deviates from experts’ rating. 
 
Table 10. Participants’ confidence in being 
wrong 
Membership Mean Std.Err. Diff. 
<12 months 5.00 .0437 -.1881*** 
(.0671)  >=12 months 5.18 .0509 
Notes: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01; Non-parametric test 
leads to qualitatively comparable results. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The currently most commonly used application to 
aggregate multiple judgements in crowdworking 
consists of simply averaging individual judgements, 
which entails several disadvantages and is susceptible to 
systematically ignores biased decisions. Hence, to 
overcome these problems researchers have proposed 
weighted models that favor more experienced judges in 
the crowd. However, this approach assumes that more 
experienced people are less inclined to making biased 
decisions.  
     Therefore, we investigate whether more experienced 
people in a crowd are less prone to decision biases. By 
conducting several experiments on a crowdworking 
platform, using the established anchoring effect as a 
treatment [6], we aim to shed light on this question. 
While previous literature on the influence of experience 
on the anchoring effect shows contradictory results, our 
results indicate that experience in different dimensions 
does not decrease the probability of following an anchor 
and therefore does not protect against biased decision-
making. This result is consistent across different 
anchors. In addition, experienced members in the crowd 
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feel more confident about their decision than less 
experienced persons, even when they are wrong (i.e. 
deviate from the experts’ evaluation of idea quality).   
We contribute to the body of literature on 
mechanisms of aggregating multiple judgements in 
crowdworking. In contrast to the previous literature in 
this context which compared the absolute results of 
different aggregating mechanisms, we specifically 
investigate the potential of the occurrence of biased 
decisions for a weighted aggregation mechanism. We 
also contribute to the literature on the anchoring effect, 
specifically in respect of the influence of experience on 
the occurrence of this effect. Further, in contrast to 
previous research in the offline context which mainly 
focused on one dimension of experience (e.g. number of 
years working in a specific job), we take several 
dimensions of experience into account and investigate 
their respective influence on anchoring. Our results also 
carry managerial implications.  
 First, companies who want to use the crowd for idea 
evaluation should be aware that even experienced 
members of the crowd might be influenced by anchors. 
Hence, weighted mechanisms to aggregate multiple 
judgements should be chosen carefully since this 
mechanism can also lead to biased results. Second, from 
the perspective of crowdworking platform designers, 
especially where the judgement process is divided into 
two or more steps, our results highlight that displaying 
the information (e.g. judgements results) from previous 
process steps in the following steps should be 
considered with caution, if biases are to be avoided.  
While our study provides important contributions, 
we also acknowledge certain limitations. First, self-
reported experience might not be an objective measure 
since participants might over-or underestimate their 
own experience. However, we argue that self-reporting 
to collect information about participants’ experience is 
a common practice in experimental research and also 
used in several other studies (e.g. [36]). Further, even if 
over-or underestimation in self-reported experience 
might have occurred, this should not lead to a systematic 
difference between the participants in the different 
experimental conditions. Second, the task assigned to 
the crowd (i.e. evaluation of business models for 
perfume) might be quite specific. However, since we 
conducted several experiments on a commercial 
crowdworking platform, our task design had to appear 
natural in this context since the crowd usually solves 
similar kinds of tasks. Finally, we did not measure 
experience with regards to having knowledge of biases, 
e.g. whether participants are aware of these and try to 
avoid them. However, we suggest that additional studies 
involving other ideas or tasks should be conducted to 
investigate whether the effect is constant for different 
tasks or types of ideas. Future work could seek to gain 
additional insight into the reasons for biased decision 
making. For example, using the “think aloud method” 
(e.g. [37]) by asking subjects in a laboratory setting to 
talk through their idea evaluation could help to 
understand the cognitive processes involved when 
solving the given tasks, enhancing our understanding of 
decision biases.  
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